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he Museum of Playa Giron – the Bay of Pigs – in the region of Cienega De 
Zapata, Cuba, celebrates the repulse of Brigade 2506 as the first reverse of 
United States (US) imperialism on the American continents. The equivalent 
Brigade 2506 Museum in Miami, dedicated to and maintained by the members of 
Brigade 2506, celebrates defeat at the Bay of Pigs as moral victory for the Cuban 
exile community. The forces were indeed implacable foes. Yet both museums 
present the common theme of the confrontation between forces of good and evil. 
Both celebrate the common philosophy that dying for one’s country is the greatest 
good a citizen may achieve. Both museums fly the common Cuban flag. Finally, both 
museums share a common culture and identify a common enemy: the United States 
of America. 
Before examining the narratives of either museum we need to understand what 
actually did take place at the Bay of Pigs between 13 and 18 April 1961. 
By the end of 1960, two years into revolutionary power, Castro had strongly 
consolidated his forces. In popular appeal and in the organization of the citizen 
militia, his regime had become much more formidable than was realised by either the 
exiles or the CIA. Though a sizeable number of dissidents worked or were ready to 
work against him, and though he had yet to declare himself a communist, eastern 
bloc arms were already flowing strongly into the country. Castro’s revolutionary army, 
though not well trained in the use of these light and heavy weapons, was huge 
compared to anything the Miami exiles were likely to muster. His few naval craft and 
dozen serviceable war planes were matched by the exiles’ expectation that the US 
would be willing put some of theirs at the Brigade’s disposal: the exiles themselves 
had none. 
Despite the huge imbalance, the counter-revolution, that is, the invasion 
designed to unseat Castro, was certainly expected. By the end of March 1961 Castro 
was waiting, minute by minute, for the first intimations of the assault which he knew 
would come soon. But when and where? Which would be the decoys and which the 
real assault force? And at which points would the Americans and what he called the 
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‘mercenaries’ strike? The Brigade members were not, of course, mercenaries, but 
volunteers backed by a large arsenal, from revolvers to tanks, supplied by the US.  
The exile army comprised 1500 troops of the volunteer Brigade 2506, not a large 
proportion of the 80,000 able-bodied Cuban men already in exile. It contained very 
few professional soldiers, mostly young men in business or university, untrained in 
arms until formally enlisted in January or February 1961. By April they waited at the 
invasion stepping off point in Guatemala, united in their desire to overturn Castro, to 
recapture the island for their families and the exile community and to restore the 
1940 constitution. They had no uncertainty as to whether they would succeed, and 
when, from January, they began to farewell their friends, it was no secret they were 
bound for advanced training in Central America. They understood that everyone, 
civilians and soldiers, would be reunited in Cuba; for after the military victory was 
won and the provisional government established, all the exiled Miami Cubans would 
be returning home. 
The campaign to retake the island had been formally endorsed by Eisenhower in 
March 1960, six months before the end of his second term. The incoming President 
was John F. Kennedy, no older, as Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev tartly put it, than 
his own eldest son. In January 1961 his new administration was still unsure of itself, 
somewhat over-respectful of Eisenhower’s military opinion and the previous planning 
and unfamiliar with how to manage relations between the State Department, the 
United Nations, the Defence Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. The 
administration was even unfamiliar with bureau-speak: Kennedy’s inner circle did not 
understand, until several weeks after the Bay of Pigs invasion, that the true meaning 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion of ‘a fair chance of success’ was in fact only thirty 
per cent. Influenced by the current political philosophy ‘Liberal anticommunism’, and 
fearful of the Soviets raising the stakes in Berlin if the US acted too openly in Cuba, 
Kennedy vetoed the initial invasion plan at Trinidad de Cuba because it ‘was too 
much like a World War Two landing’. In March he made it perfectly plain, publicly and 
face to face with the Cuban American leaders, that he would not authorise any overt 
US commitment beyond what was already promised.  
What had been promised was the use of bases in Vieques (Puerto Rico), 
Guatemala and Nicaragua as training and embarkation points for troops and planes, 
the supply of arms, payment for the freighters for troops and arms, the supply of two 
large Landing Ship Docks (known as LCDs), the use of a small number of outdated 
warplanes, to be flown, preferably, by Cuban Americans, a number of training 
grounds in the United States itself, a number of ‘military advisers’ – and the invasion 
plan itself.1 By no means all of this was known to every relevant government agency. 
Of all the US players, the CIA understood best the dangers and the possibilities 
though, as it soon transpired, many critical details had escaped its over-optimistic 
planning briefings. 
The Bay of Pigs invasion was masterminded by the CIA Chief of Operations, 
Richard Bissell. To the pessimists (that is, the realists), Bissell pointed to the 
successful overthrow of the left-leaning government of Guatemala in 1954 by a 
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somewhat analogous combination of an invasion force of dissident exiles coupled 
with an internal revolt. Bissell argued that the guerillas trying to foster revolt in the 
Sierra Maestra mountains were making no progress while Castro daily grew stronger. 
A large number of dissidents were evidently ready to rise in revolt. His infective 
optimism and senior position caused other officials to encourage their Cuban allies, 
more confidently than they should have, of the probability of ultimate US intervention. 
Surely, the exiles themselves believed, the US would not permit things to go badly 
wrong. 
Bissell’s ‘Operation Pluto’ called for troops and equipment to be ferried from 
Guatemala by five lightly armed freighters and two heavy landing craft large enough 
to carry tanks. They would stand offshore during the night invasion providing first and 
follow up supplies, ammunition, logistics and communications, protected by aircraft. 
The landings themselves were to take place on the south coast of Cuba in the area 
known as Cienega de Zapata, ‘the Great Swamp of the Caribbean’. 
Though chosen as the invasion point so late that the senior officers had no time 
to ‘war game’ the plan, the location seemed sound tactically. It was within a few 
hours drive from Havana. It was underdeveloped, even backward, and believed to 
contain few people. Its swampy terrain and spiky, almost impenetrable vegetation 
should force the retaliatory Castrista troops along its three narrow access roads. The 
landings themselves would be at Red Beach (Playa Larga, at the extreme inland end 
of the Bay of Pigs), Blue Beach (Playa Giron) and Green Beach, a point thirty 
kilometres east of Giron, to cut the road to Cienfuegos. The fourth prong of the 
assault was to be three co-ordinated paratrooper landings twenty kilometres inland, 
centring on San Blas. Simultaneously the guerillas, and what was assumed to be a 
huge number of dissidents, would emerge from either forests or city apartments to 
continue the internal overthrow of the regime. 
The successful landing of a sizeable amphibious assault force on unknown 
beaches is the most difficult military manoeuvre of all to accomplish – and even more 
so at night. The plan, indeed, might have been sound, even ingenious, but in the end 
success depended on complete mastery of the air both to protect the landing craft 
and to harass the troops which would undoubtedly be rushed from Havana to oppose 
the Brigade. Other potential problems were not seriously discussed: the inadequate 
airstrip, the massive imbalance in troop numbers and the unknown number of 
Cubans who might – or might not – join the Brigade after the invasion. Other 
problems were not discussed at all. It was assumed rather than demonstrated that 
hardly anyone lived in the Cienega de Zapata region, that the dark shadows 
appearing in air reconnaissance photos of the planned invasion site at Playa Giron 
were seaweed, that the Brigade members, in the event of difficulty, would be able to 
fight their way to the Escambray mountains to set up guerilla bases – even though 
they stood many kilometres away across almost impenetrable country. 
The plan continued: the area of Brigade control, some sixty kilometres wide, 
would be held for at least seventy-two hours until members of the Provisional 
Government in Exile flew from Miami to establish themselves. At this point the 
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invasion could be officially regarded by the United States as legitimate. Protection 
would need to be continuously provided from war planes and ships. Supplies would 
continue to be landed for thirty days. 
Things went wrong for the Brigade even before the landings. Operation Pluto’s 
preliminary phase was the intended destruction of the small Cuban Air force by 
Brigade pilots, aided by some Americans. Two days before the invasion they would 
use sixteen twin engined, and somewhat antiquated World War Two B26 attack 
bombers to destroy Castro’s tiny air force then provide protection for the ground 
troops on shore. Shortly before the raid Kennedy, fearful of international criticism and 
escalation of the cold war, ordered the number of planes reduced to eight. Damaging 
strikes were made, for the loss of two aircraft, but the plan failed in that Castro 
retained a small number of T33 jet aircraft and British-built Sea Furies, against which 
ships had proved especially vulnerable. For the same reason Kennedy cancelled the 
second strike planned to coincide with the land invasion itself at dawn on Monday 17 
April. 
At 11.45 pm on 16 April frogmen approached the beach of Playa Giron. Eighty 
metres from shore their craft encountered the coral reefs, wrongly identified by CIA 
reconnaissance as seaweed, forcing the men to jump overboard and wade ashore. 
Commander in Chief Jose Perez San Ramon ordered the 4th Battalion ashore 
several hours earlier than planned. The men began hurriedly to disembark in some 
disorganisation. But by dawn almost all the troops and equipment planned to land 
that night had done so and the Castrista militia was temporarily in retreat. 
Thirty kilometres away at Playa Larga, Erneido Oliva, Second in Command, 
successfully landed the 2nd Battalion. Del Valle established his paratroopers as 
planned at San Blas and dug in to repel the expected assault by Castro’s arriving 
troops. 
By three am Castro had taken the critical, and correct, decision to attack the 
supply ships at first light by air. Shortly after dawn Houston, carrying a huge quantity 
of petrol and ammunition, was hit by rockets from a Sea Fury (a single engine World 
War Two attack bomber) and was beached by her captain not far from the shore. 
Then at 8.30am the Rio Escondido, carrying the main communications link, was 
attacked and sunk. Without the expected air cover, and extremely vulnerable to 
attack, the other three transports retreated out of range without unloading any of their 
supplies for what was intended to be the consolidation of the Brigade front. 
Probably the battle could not at this point have been won by the Brigade unless, 
possibly, air protection had allowed the remaining equipment and troops to be 
landed. On the ground, though, Oliva first held out, then advanced against the militia. 
He confronted at least 2000 enemy troops at what was later known as the Battle of 
the Rotunda, a strategic intersection of major roads amidst the swamps and 
impenetrable ground. 
By evening of the first full day’s fighting, the paratroopers held their position at 
San Blas. The Brigade troops defending the three roads allowing access to the area 
could last indefinitely provided, firstly, that their ammunition held out and, secondly, 
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that Castro did not continue his assault for twenty-four hours a day. But without air 
support neither could they advance. All night the Castrisas kept coming. The 
Brigade’s orders were to resist and where necessary to stage a tactical and 
destructive retreat. 
By mid afternoon of the second day Oliva himself was falling back before a huge 
advance led by tanks. That evening, almost out of ammunition, he withdrew to Giron. 
Late in the day supplies were dropped but most were blown off course by the wind 
into the sea or the inaccessible swamps. As further distraction four B26s were to 
attack the Castrista land forces.  
The third and last day of the campaign, Wednesday 19 April, began with the 
scheduled raid by the Brigade planes. Two were shot down but the devastating effect 
of aerial attack on the incoming Castrista troops (unacknowledged in the Playa Giron 
Museum) indicated how air support provided by even a few B26s might have 
changed the battle at least long enough for all the supplies to be landed. At a war 
council Oliva proposed to consolidate all forces, including the paratroopers, and fight 
their way to the Escambray mountains to continue as a guerilla force. By mid 
afternoon the whole Brigade was under sustained attack from north, west and east 
and from the air. Kennedy ordered two destroyers to escort the supply ships in a 
different role: to rescue the Brigade. They did not arrive until evening, too late to save 
any but a few of the Brigade soldiers.  
One hundred and forty Brigade members died. Almost all the rest – some 1190 – 
were taken prisoner under conditions which varied at first between fair and appalling. 
Sixty of the most seriously wounded left Cuba in April 1962. But the others did not 
return to the US until 23 December, twenty months after the invasion and after the 
Missile Crisis. Bitterness over the ‘betrayal’ at the Bay of Pigs, the foundational 
narrative of the Brigade 2506 Museum in Miami, was born at Giron and fed in the 
long months of captivity. The Cubans, according to print sources no longer 
unobtainable, and whose existence is now denied, may have lost some 1650 men 
and 2000 wounded. Such sacrifices lend moral force to the Museum of Playa Giron’s 
principal claim that the failed assault was the first major setback of American 
imperialism in the continent. 
These are the essential facts as far as the now fairly extensive sources allow. 
The most salient facts to recall in the discussion of the Museum narratives is that the 
assault force was certainly expected from Guatemala but no Castrista knew where 
the landing or landings would occur. The US masterminded and backed the first 
stage of a counter-revolution which could not have taken place without the serious 
involvement of the exile and internal dissident communities themselves. The CIA 
drastically overestimated the number of internal dissidents who would, or could, take 
up arms in support of the Brigade and they were in any case seriously uninformed of 
much crucial geographical data. Despite some less than heroic actions by a minority 
on both sides, both forces fought with extraordinary courage and valour. None of the 
Cuban members of the Brigade were mercenaries.2 
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Geographically, the reference in Cuba furthest from the site of the battle itself is 
to be found outside the Museum of the Revolution in Havana. Here stands a tank 
with the inscription: 
 
Sau 100 Soviet Tank from which  
Fidel fired direct hits  
on the ship ‘Houston’ equipped  
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the  
mercenary invasion of Giron in April 1961 
 
That wouldn’t have been very difficult because by the time that Casro fired his shots 
the Houston was already grounded and wrecked.  
Two and a half hours drive from Havana lie the Zapata swamps. Though tourists 
flock to the beachside resorts, access is still difficult and the hinterland comparatively 
underdeveloped.3 The road is wide and flat and cleared twenty metres on each side 
before the palm trees and bananas. 
Traffic from the capital still takes the visitor past the area known, oddly, as 
Central Australia where Castro held his advanced headquarters. A rather 
unprepossessing concrete monument nearby marks the site where a Castrista 
soldier died. 
Approaching Playa Larga the visitor encounters a phenomenon familiar in 
Eastern Europe where publicly displayed historical artifacts and signage reinforced 
the prevailing political philosophy. There, memorials were utilised to preserve what 
the dominant (non Jewish) group wanted to remember. The communist regime 
insisted on the equation of communism with the long Polish struggle for 
independence: ‘The Jews were eliminated physically by the Nazis; the memory of the 
Jews has been eliminated systematically by the Poles’.4 Thus the visitor views the 
thickening roadside monuments erected to Castrista soldiers each at the site of 
death. A huge hoarding depicts a regional map positioning Playa Larga and Playa 
Giron with the slogan: 
 
What you will see here in this municipality is the work of the Revolution. 
 
One passes one of the huge three way intersections – the Rotunda along which the 
Brigade advanced, then held the counter-attack – the scene of the most courageous 
and desperate fighting. A hoarding reads: 
 
Here was waged a decisive battle towards Victory. 
  
A concrete monument is inscribed with the names of twenty-seven Castristas who 
fell. A huge hoarding proclaims the site of Playa Giron as ‘the first great defeat of 
Imperialism in Latin America’. 
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The Play Giron museum is a further twenty kilometres away at the town of 
Buenaventura, at Playa Larga. It is a long, low building in front of which stand a Sea 
Fury and a tank. The signage on the aeroplane identifies it as having been used at 
Giron. The tank is said to be ‘similar to that used by the Commander in Chief in the 
destruction of the ship Houston’. Entering, the visitor finds a vestibule leading to the 
display in the right of the building – events leading up to the battle – and the left – the 
battle and its aftermath. 
In the center of the vestibule is collected a large display of press cuttings, the 
only concession to modern display design in the whole collection. On a red board 
some four metres long the letters GIRON are printed with a photographic montage 
drawn from newspapers drawn from 1950s Cuba. This is the state’s nod to its version 
of pre-revolutionary Cuba. The cuttings on the ‘G’, for example, contain a sign 
‘Whites Section Only’ showing a black man staring at a wire fence, a newspaper 
article beginning ‘Cuba, Factory of Capitalism’ and a more modern caption: ‘The 
People reject The Eviction Law’. Underneath reads: 
  
VICTORY OF SOCIALISM. 
  
Another letter of the word ‘Giron’ contains the cutting: 
  
New Attacks by Pirate Planes from the North 
 
An introductory panel of the display reads: 
 
Our National Revolutionary Militia, the Rebel Army, the National 
Revolutionary Police, the Revolutionary Navy joined to the efficient 
action of the reduced Air Force eliminated in some 65 hours the well 
equipped invasion sent by the United States. 
 
This battle destroyed on the continent the myth of the invincibility of 
imperialism, encouraged the struggle of the American peoples and 
consolidated our Socialist Revolution. Testimonies of the heroic 
struggle waged by the Cuban people in those days figure in this 
museum. 
 
The so-called mercenaries have not even been mentioned. It is the United 
States, not the Brigade, which this museum holds responsible for the invasion. 
To enter the right hand section the visitor passes a sectioned series of life 
sized photographs showing the defeated Brigade members, heads mostly 
bowed, marching into captivity. To enter the left, one passes a similar display of 
Castrisas marching with heads erect.  
The first part of the exhibition proper is given over to the description of the 
Cienega region before the revolution: 
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The deep process of transformation begun by the Revolution was put 
in the hands of the people, gave the land to those who worked it and 
eliminated forever the large estates. The nationalisation of banks and 
big businesses, the property of Yankee monopolies and the national 
bourgeoisie, the Law of Urban Reform and the control of teaching 
concluded the phase of national liberation. 
The imperialists and the bourgeoisie expelled from power began 
terrorist acts, diplomatic blackmail economic blockade and armed 
aggression with the aim of destroying the revolution.  
 
The social structure of the Brigade is analysed: 
 
The composition of the ‘Mercenary Brigade’ revealed the interests 
that the [now] stateless persons sought to reintroduce. An analysis of 
the prisoners showed that 800 of them, or their families, possessed 
370,268 hectare of ground, 9666 houses and buildings, 70 industries, 
10 sugar complexes, five mines and two banks. There figured also 
135 ex-military from the Batistan tyranny, and 65 criminals, among 
them 3 known assassins and torturers. For several days television 
and radio carried to the country the actual interrogation of the 
mercenaries. The destruction of Brigade 2506 showed to the world its 
reactionary and criminal nature.  
 
This first section of the display is more like a polemic on walls than a modern 
exhibition text. Of the paper exhibits, only one pronouncement by Castro appears to 
be original. It reads in part: 
 
The Country Will Resist with a Firm Foot  
At six in the morning today, the 15th of April 1961, B 26 aeroplanes of 
North American make simultaneously bombarded points in the city of 
Havana, San Antonio De Los Baños and Santiago de Cuba 
according to reports received to the present… 
 
Our country has been the victim of imperialist criminal aggression 
which violates all the norms of International Rights… 
 
If the attack should be a prelude to invasion the country, on a war 
footing, will resist and destroy each force which intends to land on 
our land with an iron hand. 
 
Further down the wall the visitor reads: 
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The aerial bombardment of 15 April provoked the popular rebuff, 
tightened revolutionary cohesion and confirmed the unshakeable 
decision to defend the patria at whatever cost was necessary. 
 
A series of coloured and detailed maps trace the dispositions and movements over 
the three days of the combat. Clearly the information of the Brigade’s intentions and 
disposition has been drawn from the many books published by the former Brigade 
members themselves: 
 
Our pilots and artillery shot down 11 bomber planes. 
  
Another caption, more accurately, claims five. 
The second wing of the Museum presents the stages of battle in close detail in 
which guns of every variety form the majority of the exhibits. In the centre of the 
second wing is arranged an exhibitions of light and heavy weapons used both by the 
Brigade and by the Castristas. One, on a Browning 50mm machine gun, used by the 
Brigade, carries the caption: 
 
The invading mercenaries brought with them a fabulous amount of this 
style of weapon in proportion to the number of men. 
  
James Delgado, Executive Director of the Vancouver Maritime Museum, describes 
the exhibits as ‘more a triumphant display of the enemy’s weapons than a museum’.5 
Most of the final wall space is dedicated to the ‘Heroes of Giron’. Some 170 
photographed faces stare grimly from the wall, above the artifacts in glass cases of 
clothing, equipment, tobacco tins and letters. One photograph, for example, of a 
young man seeming no more than 17, carries the caption: 
 
Luis Fernandez Rodriguez 
Born in Vedado, Havana, 21 June 1942. Worker for Artes Graficas… 
Participated in the Cleansing of Escambray [against guerillas in the 
Escambray Mountains] the third detachment of light infantry. 
Mechanic of Bon 1213, mobilized to Playa Giron. Died 18 April 1961 
 
Photographs include the word FIDEL allegedly written by a soldier with his dying 
blood. Exhibits in this section contain a pair of high heel shoes destroyed by a bullet 
and the clothing of five civilian women also killed in the bombing. 
The concluding caption relating to the assault reads: 
  
At dawn on the 19th began the simultaneous advance of our forces. 
From the west they spread and battered the points of enemy resistance 
two km from Giron, where the enemy made themselves strong. There 
they held up the advance and located the artillery again. In the east 
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and northeast the spread of our forces enabled us to capture those 
trying to escape. At 2 pm they attempted a re-embarkation which was 
frustrated by artillery fire and aviation. At 17.30 Play Giron fell, the last 
stronghold of the mercenaries. 
 
Castro has the last word: 
 
This day Yankee Imperialism suffered in America its first great defeat, 
according to the Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro. 
 
Thus the Cuban State presents its account of the campaign.  
While the military details of the campaign are reasonably accurate, the historical 
interpretation, as everywhere in Cuba from museums to cemeteries, follows the 
Castrista position. In a lecture to a national Cuban Congress in 1999, one of Castro’s 
key subordinates, Jose Ramon Fernandez, drawing upon a number of named US 
and Brigade histories, told a very similar story.6 Both the museum’s and Fernandez’ 
account hammered, above all, at the twin themes: the supposedly mercenary status 
of the Brigade soldiers and the profound involvement of the US.  
It is the interpretation of the casualties that is most at fault. The number of 
Castrista death is likely to have been much closer to 2000 than the 200 claimed in 
the Museum. The prisoners are asserted to have been treated well but no mention is 
made of the nine men who died in an overcrowded airless sealed truck taking them 
to Havana.7 Everywhere, in defiance of good sense, the Cuban born Brigade 
members are labeled ‘mercenaries’. It is not at all obvious, given the enormous list of 
farms, houses and businesses which they had allegedly lost, why the exiles would 
have had to be paid to attempt to retake their lost possessions. The soldiers need, for 
propaganda purposes, to be mercenaries because the principal purpose of the 
Museum is to denigrate the failure of ‘Yanqui’ imperialism.  
Finally, the Castrista interpretation of the assault ends on the 18th of April. Yet 
for the Brigade members themselves, the second and equally important part of the 
story begins at the moments of surrender. The standard account of the Brigade 
commanders, The Bay of Pigs, published in 1964, devotes a further 150 pages to the 
period of imprisonment and negotiation by the Cuban Families and the Tractors for 
Freedom committees. Imprisonment in a number of Cuban locations bonded the 
Brigade men more much tightly than the three-day battle itself. 
It was in twenty months of intimidation and interrogation in Cuban prisons, when 
a different outcome of the Missile Crisis might well have ended their lives, that the 
strongest bonds between the Brigadistas were formed. They applaud themselves, 
with justification, for having answered a call to arms and endured bitter defeat while 
still achieving their own moral victory in withstanding intimidation in clandestine and 
public trials. Here courage was tested, assessed and enshrined in their collective 
memory. They saw themselves in extremis, emerging with a foundational narrative of 
coherence and moral conviction. Their victory comes at the expense of those Brigade 
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members who remained on the ships, and worse, those who merely talked of their 
patriotism and stayed in Miami.  
At midnight on every seventeenth of April the remaining Cuban-American 
brigadistas meet at the Cuban memorial Boulevard in the Cuban American downtown 
in Miami. Here at first, in silence, the ageing soldiers recall their comrades, the event 
and, in particular, the martyrs. They gather round the concrete column topped by an 
eternal flame surrounded by two chain barriers, the innermost supported by four six-
inch shells. The inscription reads, in Spanish: 
 
CUBA 
To the  
Martyrs 
Of the 
Assault 
Brigade 
17 April  
1961 
 
Here stands, then, no monument to the Brigade itself but to its martyrs. Patria o 
Muerte, Country or Death, resonates as strongly here as it does in Cuba. Que morir 
por la patria es vivir, to die for the patria is to live, is the key element of the Cuban 
national anthem. Any soldier who had written ‘La Brigada’ with his dying blood would 
be honoured here as surely as the Castrista hero. 
The service ends. The brigadistas will meet here tomorrow for a more convivial 
gathering of memorialising and celebration. They pride themselves that after forty-
seven years of Cuban American threat, menace and empty talk, they are the only 
ones who have actually done anything about rescuing their country from the 
Fidelistas. And it is now clear, after more than four decades of futile exile rhetoric, 
that that there will be no more attempts. Miami today holds more than a million 
Cuban exiles. The embarrassment felt by younger exiles that the Assault Brigade 
was both the first and last permeates macho Cuban Miami society. Yet for the over-
fifties the Brigade history is both a source of patriotic pride and an unwelcome 
reminder of their own failures. That essential dichotomy underpins all that the 
Brigade stands for, between those who went and those who only talked. 
A visit to the Brigade 2506 Museum in Little Havana, Miami, is part of the Florida 
Cuban Heritage Trail.8 Described in the brochure as ‘quaint’ and ‘homelike’, it is 
housed in an unpretentious bungalow in Miami’s Little Havana. From outside it 
resembles a house or family museum: and so indeed it is – the family of Brigadistas. 
Perhaps, too, like the exiles who died and were buried in simple graves in the early 
1960s, they expected only a short stay in Miami. The Brigadistas raised funds for its 
purchase by pooling their financial resources. Its is clear that no professional curator 
has worked here. Rather, the presentation seems to be the work of the Brigade 
members themselves. The presentation, too, most unusually makes no overt 
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connection between the Brigade and the usual Cuban antecedents of the War of 
Independence heroes Maceo or Martí. The first martyr whom the visitor confronts is 
not a hero of the Spanish war but Nestor Izquierdo, the first Brigade soldier to die in 
combat. The Brigade is writing its own contribution to Cuba’s continuing war of 
independence. 
Just inside the entrance, where, equivalently, the Playa Giron museum presents 
the massive display Heroes of Giron, are testimonies to the present and past Brigade 
leadership. In 1996 a discordant note resounded in the tiny space. Amidst the 
solemnity stood a large, garish Coke machine and a dwarf statuette of Uncle Sam, 
inviting the visitor to drop ash and cigar stubs into his hat. It is intentionally 
disrespectful. Today that Uncle Sam has gone. But another, only slightly less 
disrespectful caricature occupies the same space. The awkward, ambiguous tone 
which foreshadowed the anti-Americanism of the 1996 narrative is no more resolved 
than a decade ago.9 It is no accident that the Museum’s most recent website 
describes one of its purposes as outlining the changes in the lives of millions of 
people that live in the Americas as a result of ‘this fiasco’. 
Leaving the vestibule, the visitor walks through the Dr Manuel F. Artime Library. 
The Library’s conference table and thousands of dark shelved books establishes the 
credentials of sobriety, rationality and truth of those who were once young and angry 
and who later became the pillars of the male Miami exile society. Many conference 
rooms in Cuba, thanks to the Blockade and to the general impoverishment of cultural 
facilities, today resemble nothing better than undergraduate meeting rooms of 
Australian universities. The dignified Artime library resembles a company Boardroom, 
representing, accurately enough, the minor family corporation which the Brigade has 
become. Here, then, is a family sanctuary as much as museum. Here the Cuban 
virtues of courage in adversity are displayed and celebrated. 
The central hall, the dark brown and white Chamber of Arms, continues the 
theme of serious reverence. Ten rows of chairs are arranged like a chapel, looking to 
an altar-like depiction of a running figure, bayonet outstretched. Above the figure is 
the banner on which is inscribed Brigada Asalto. A Cuban flag adorns the right hand 
side, a US flag, required by law, is on the other. To the right is furled the flag of the 
Brigade itself, presented to Kennedy on his promise that it next would fly in a free 
Cuba, embargoed amongst his state possessions after his assassination and only 
returned to the Museum after an unseemly legal battle with the curators of the 
Kennedy Library. 
On the wall facing the audience, reaching to the floor and above the doors, are 
fixed the 140 A4 sized black and white photographs of the martyrs, under the 
modestly lettered caption ‘Martires de Giron’. These identically serious young men 
present themselves mostly in suit and tie: there was neither time nor opportunity to 
photograph them as they prepared themselves for training in Guatemala. To the right 
stands a three-dimensional full size sculptured soldier. The ambience presents the 
climax of struggle, yet the Chamber remains a room of mourning. The icons are not 
triumphant young soldiers in combat fatigues but dead heroes presided over by 
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priests of equal stature, held in the temple of respect and worship. On the left are 
photographs of the martyrs, those who died during the assault or in prison. On the 
right are photos of the ‘Heroes’, jowly, respectable, middle aged or older. 
The guide, a proud brigadista, makes clear what is already implied in the display: 
that one only becomes a Hero through death. For even a brigadista, regrettably, is 
capable of unworthy action later in life. Only on death does he become incapable of 
dishonourable action; only now does he become a Martyr. What would be 
dishonourable? The answer is clear for some whose names are proscribed on an 
undated list. To have been a dialoguero, one who went to dialogue with the Cuban 
government, is an action heinous enough to the Brigade Association management to 
have one’s name expunged not only from the rolls of honour but from Brigade 
memory. Another list names two men expelled for having flown from Cuba to 
negotiate the release of their fellow prisoners but who did not, as promised, return. 
The spaces filled not with a photograph but the Brigade emblem reveals, at this most 
solemn site, the bitter divisions within the exile community. 
On the third wall of the Chamber of Arms are the historical exhibits, principally 
narrating the events after the surrender, photographs of capture, imprisonment, 
interrogation, release and return. The actual details of the three-day battle are much 
less clear than in the Cuban museum, for the Brigade’s claim to moral victory lies not 
in what happened on the beaches. Only key pictorial incidents follow, such as the 
shooting of the US pilots: 
 
ASSASSINS 
Bodies of Pete Ray and Francis Leo Baker on the floor of the Australian 
Sugar Mill after been shot in the head by Fernandez Mel. Both pilots were 
captured alive but wounded and cold bloodily executed. 
 
And: 
 
Body of a Brigade tanker crew killed in action, his boots were taken as 
souvenirs by the Castro communist forces. 
 
The aftermath: 
 
Ten die of Hunger and Thirst 
 
A third ‘key’ incident is the moment during the trial of the defeated exiles, at which the 
soldier Afro-Cuban Tomas Cruz was asked by Castro why he had returned when 
under Batista he hadn’t been allowed on the beaches. He replied: ‘I did not come to 
Cuba to swim on the beaches.’ 
The brigade, given its level of American support, could hardly have succeeded: 
the strong implication holds that Kennedy’s administration never gave it a fair go. By 
far the most space is given over to the return of the prisoners to Miami, more 
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significant to the brigadistas than the assault itself. Photographs depict the queuing in 
Havana to board the aircraft, scenes inside the aircraft and people disembarking and 
greeting relatives. Almost every Miami Cuban over fifty five recalls the extraordinary 
moment of silence when, on 14 April 1962, the planes carrying the badly wounded 
arrived at Miami airport: Gloria Morena, then 13 years old, recalls: 
 
Imagine! They made it! They were on our side! We saw the red carpet with 
Cuban and American flags. It was really the return of grand grand heroes. I 
just remember the long strip of red carpet leading to the stairs, and this gasp 
of expectation and joy. Joy. I think there was silence first. In the midst of is 
much tragedy we had extracted these lives. As soon as that door opened. 
And each stood at the top of the stairs with Colonel Bogey playing, and they 
saluted the flag as best they could. Some were on crutches, some had no 
legs, some had no right arm to salute with. Such pride, they were standing as 
tall as they could even in the wheelchair. It was done very slowly. Each man 
was given his moment. There I remember women in the crowed fainting, just 
fainting from sheer emotion, sisters and grandmothers. We were so proud. It 
was really a moment when all the best of Cuban history had taught us, we 
were witnessing it again. They were our mambices [freedom fighters against 
the Spanish] of our generation. To me it was the most moving moment in the 
whole of the Playa Giron saga. To see these men who had come home, and 
they were proud and they were saluting the flag. They didn’t come in a 
despondent mood, they came in a triumphant mood and I think that 
triumphant mood has carried the Brigade ever since.10 
 
Yet none of the joy felt so strongly by seemingly everyone present is alluded to. Nor 
does the visitor feel the tumultuous occasion as the guard of honour formed for the 
President by the Brigade members as he entered the Miami Orange Bowl. Nor is the 
roar of approval which followed his promise to return the flag to a free Cuba. Rather, 
the photograph of Kennedy receiving, from San Ramon, the flag which had flown for 
three days at the Command Post is reproduced with the ominously simple caption: 
 
I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free 
Havana. 
 
The anti-Americanism is implied in what is not said. The principal emotion which the 
Brigade museum communicates is the quiet responsibility of the mature macho. 
In this museum, as in Cuba, there is no moral uncertainty. Conclusions are 
already drawn, there can be no alternative view. Silences, omissions, oblique 
references to Kennedy’s alleged failed support replace explicit condemnation. But the 
message is clear. If there is an enemy at all within these walls it is not the Castristas 
nor the CIA but Kennedy himself. The President is shown shaking hands with the 
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soldiers whom he had earlier – so runs the least sympathetic interpretation – 
betrayed. 
A display of congressmen’s letters in tribute to the Brigade accentuates the 
dichotomy between what the President did and what he should have done. Outside in 
the parking lot, in 1996, an old thirty-foot launch lay becalmed on the asphalt. She 
was ‘La Libertad’. The guide explained that she had been used on a number of 
clandestine missions to Cuba and that he would next captain the boat to the island 
after liberation. Thereafter he would never set eyes again upon the US. Such a 
provenance, written out, would be unacceptable: self-censorship is part of the 
unwritten contract between the Brigade and the US administrations. Nor have such 
anti-American sentiments diminished over time. A statement released in March 2005 
by the Brigade leaders promises that although they ‘do not know hatred’, they ‘reject 
any kind of dialogue with the dictatorship’ but add, significantly, that ‘they will not 
permit any foreign interference, whatever it may be, that violates the sovereignty of 
the republic of Cuba’.11 
The more subtle messages await the sharp-eyed visitor who has time to talk to 
the guides and read the closely-typed documents. A pamphlet of the time 
disingenuously describes the brigade as composed of many races: Argentinians, 
Peruvians, North Americans, Cubans, ‘some military personnel of Castro’s army’ and 
‘some from the former army’, as if the force was an international peace-loving, anti-
communist, well-meaning crusade. The overthrown president Batista’s name is 
nowhere mentioned in the captions. Yet a file marked ‘Your eyes only’, recently 
released from the US Archives, reveals that the successful brigadistas were to 
dissociate themselves clearly from the previous government. It was sound advice: 
few Cubans remaining on the island would have welcomed a return of the Batistianos 
after a Brigade victory. The guide – but no caption – explains ‘nearly all of us were 
trained by Batista’s army or police – that’s why we went back!’. Elsewhere in Miami 
the visitor may even learn a few points not mentioned in the display. A city plaque at 
some distance from the museum entitled ‘Impact of the “Bay of Pigs” on Miami’, 
reads that the failed assault: 
 
did not destroy the dream of returning to Cuba but it did make many more 
look at Miami as more than a temporary refuge. Careers, education and the 
starting of new lives became important concerns of the refugees.  
 
Probably all the brigade members would privately admit this to be true but not 
everyone would wish it said so publicly. 
Our introduction proposed that the museums share a common culture. One 
element, as we argued in our 1998 article in this journal, is machismo.12 Some of the 
faces displayed in the Chamber of Arms of the Brigade Museum appear, though 
unidentified, in photographs of the young revolutionaries of 1956-9 in the Museum of 
the Revolution in Havana. Some photographs appear, though with different captions, 
in both the Brigade and the Bay of Pigs museums. All the Brigade members lived in 
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Cuba in the 1950s. Their leaders were prominent pro-Castro revolutionaries before 
and soon after January 1959. The now deadly foes drank at the same well of armed 
struggle, brotherhood and guns. Of the thousands of revolutionary Cubans who later 
called themselves socialists, patriots, communists or democrats, many had wanted 
Batista to be overthrown and had shouldered arms together to that end. They fought 
under the same flag, even after they became enemies. Nearly all the brigadistas at 
the time of the invasion had family members still living on the island. Some were 
taken prisoner by their own cousins. Castro knew all the Brigade leaders by name. 
Once or twice he came to their cells to chat, brandish a pistol at them, offer a drink or 
ask them why they had changed sides. 
Equally important today is a shared anti-Americanism. While Castro’s name as 
‘villain’ is scarcely mentioned, Kennedy’s – pejoratively – is everywhere. In the 
Brigade Museum the President makes the (unsourced) remark as the campaign 
began: ‘If it’s Cuba they want to go to, dump them there’. At some points the 
message is more explicit. A brigade soldier is seen to state: ‘the people we trusted let 
us down’. At other points the opprobrium is universal: ‘The loss [of the Brigade] has 
caused death, unrest and instability for South American, Central American, 
Caribbean and African countries for the past four decades’. The Old Guard will not 
resile from its perceived betrayal. ‘We were your allies, your cousins, your family’, 
whispers the museum, ‘yet you would not help us in our hour of greatest need’. 
Featured is an account of Perez García, the Cuban patriot who became the most 
highly decorated soldier in the Pacific theatre of World War II: look how much, runs 
the implication, Cubans have helped the Americans in battle. 
Nothing is to be found here of the re-assessment of historical interpretations in 
US museums affecting, for example, slavery. For most of the twentieth century the 
US heritage industry suffered from slavery-amnesia. In the interpretations of most 
museums, Civil War soldiers fought to save the Union rather than to end slavery. 
Tour guides of southern mansions referred to ‘servants’; slave quarters were not part 
of the tour. Guilt and shame seemed to prevent a more open discussion. The 
attitudes of ‘middle America’ began to change only after television and film 
spectaculars like Roots and Amistad.13 Yet it is not as though the Brigade view of 
itself is unchallenged. The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum 
website obliquely blames the landing place, Eisenhower, the CIA, the Miami exiles 
and the Cuban people who failed to rise in support and features a photograph 
Kennedy at the Miami Bowl.14 
While the leadership of each museum remains no new interpretation is at all 
probable. Playa Giron will remain locked in a modern-looking but in fact old-
fashioned model of public propaganda that is by no means shared by many Cuban 
youth.15 In Miami, the Brigade Museum is more likely to be by-passed without 
change. A new Bay of Pigs Museum, coupled significantly with the history of the Cold 
War, is planned by a younger generation of Cuban exiles. Its curators seem less 
preoccupied with individual heroism while seeking to set the events in a wider Latin 
American context. They aim to: 
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create a modern, world-class Cold War museum in Miami honoring the US-
trained Brigade 2506's heroic fight against Fidel Castro's communist 
dictatorship in Cuba. The high-tech, multimedia Museum will preserve the 
history of the dramatic Bay of Pigs invasion and describe Brigade veteran 
actions in other conflicts with Castro worldwide. It also will honor others who 
fought for freedom in Cuba. The museum will place all these events in the 
broader Cold War context and show how Miami was on the front lines in the 
battle for freedom.16 
 
The Playa Giron Museum is accurate in the microcosmic analysis of the campaign 
but fails grossly in its interpretation of the reasons for the invasion. Its anti-
imperialism, for political and strategic reasons, is markedly overstated. The Brigade 
Museum excludes every emotion except that of quiet and corporatised manly virtue. 
What unites both museums is the sense of moral victory, not over each other, but 
over the United States of America. 
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